Browser Security

Cybersecurity 13 Sep 2026 7 min read

Content Security Policy Turns Script Trust Into an Explicit Boundary

A web application can escape database queries correctly, authenticate every API request, and still hand an attacker code execution in the browser through one unsafe rendering path. The browser is unusually permissive by design: HTML can load scripts from remote origins, inline blocks can execute code, and dynamic DOM operations can turn strings into active content. Content Security Policy, or CSP, gives an application a second control plane for that execution environment.

Cybersecurity CSP

Cybersecurity 12 Sep 2026 6 min read

DNS Rebinding Turns Name Resolution Into a Browser Pivot

DNS Rebinding Turns Name Resolution Into a Browser Pivot A browser tab does not need direct knowledge of a private network to become a useful bridge into it. If an attacker controls a hostname and its DNS answers, the same hostname can first resolve to an attacker-controlled public server and later resolve to an address reachable only from the browser’s network. The page keeps using a familiar origin label while the destination behind that label changes.

Cybersecurity Web Security

Cybersecurity 12 Sep 2026 8 min read

CORS Is a Browser Read Boundary, Not an API Firewall

CORS Is a Browser Read Boundary, Not an API Firewall An API can reject every cross-origin browser response and still receive the underlying requests. That distinction is easy to lose when Cross-Origin Resource Sharing is described as an access-control feature without naming the actor it constrains: browser script. CORS extends the browser’s same-origin model by letting a server state which origins may access selected responses. It does not turn the server into a network firewall, authenticate a caller, or guarantee that a request never reaches application code. A command-line client, backend service, malware process, or custom HTTP stack does not have to enforce browser CORS rules at all.

Cybersecurity Web Security